Supreme Court Decision Syllabus (scotus)

Send us a textIn Monsalvo Velazquez v. Bondi  the Supreme Court held that when a voluntary departure deadline under 8 U.S.C. §1229c(b)(2) lands on a weekend or legal holiday, it carries over to the next business day. Monsalvo Velázquez had been granted 60 days to voluntarily depart the U.S. He filed a motion to reopen on the following Monday after day 60 fell on a Saturday. The Board of Immigration Appeals and the Tenth Circuit rejected the motion as late, reading “60 days” to mean calendar days, no exceptions. The Court reversed. Drawing on longstanding legal and regulatory practice, the majority held that “days” in this context includes the standard rule: deadlines falling on a weekend or holiday extend to the next business day. Congress legislated against that backdrop, and nothing in the statute suggested a break from it. Justice Gorsuch wrote for the Court, joined by Roberts, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson. Justice Thomas dissented, joined by Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett in part. Alito and Barrett also f

Send us a textIn Cunningham v. Cornell University, the Supreme Court addressed a fundamental pleading question under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Petitioners—former and current Cornell University employees—alleged that university fiduciaries violated ERISA §1106(a)(1)(C) by causing their retirement plans to pay excessive fees for recordkeeping services to Fidelity and TIAA-CREF, both parties in interest. The Second Circuit dismissed the claim, holding that plaintiffs must also plead that the transaction wasn’t exempt under §1108(b)(2)(A), which allows for reasonable arrangements with service providers.The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. Writing for the Court, Justice Sotomayor held that §1106(a)(1)(C) sets out a categorical bar against certain transactions between plans and parties in interest, and plaintiffs need only plausibly plead the elements of that section to state a claim. The §1108 exemptions—such as those permitting “reasonable arrangements” for necessary services

Send us a textIn Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al. v. J.G.G., et al., the Supreme Court granted the government’s application to vacate temporary restraining orders issued by the District Court for the District of Columbia, which had blocked the removal of several Venezuelan detainees allegedly affiliated with the foreign terrorist organization Tren de Aragua (TdA). The detainees challenged President Trump’s Proclamation No. 10903, issued under the Alien Enemies Act (AEA), which authorized their detention and removal.The Court construed the TROs as appealable injunctions and held that the detainees’ claims must be brought in habeas corpus. Because the claims necessarily challenged the legality of confinement and removal under the AEA, they fell within the “core” of habeas jurisdiction. As such, jurisdiction and venue lay solely in the district of confinement—Texas—not in the District of Columbia. The Court emphasized that equitable relief cannot be sought outside habeas in this context, r

Send us a textIn Department of Education, et al. v. California, the Supreme Court in a per curiam decision granted the federal government’s application to stay a district court order that had mandated continued payment of certain education-related grants. The District Court for the District of Massachusetts had issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) on March 10, 2025, barring the termination of grant payments and requiring the government to pay both past-due and ongoing obligations. The lower court found that the states challenging the terminations were likely to succeed on their claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Supreme Court, however, treated the TRO as a de facto preliminary injunction and concluded that the district court likely lacked jurisdiction to order monetary payments under the APA. Citing precedents such as Sampson v. Murray and Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, the Court emphasized that the APA does not waive sovereign immunity for claims that essential

Send us a textIn Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn, the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit and held that a plaintiff may seek treble damages under the civil RICO statute for injuries to business or property, even if those injuries stem from a personal injury. Douglas Horn was fired after testing positive for THC, allegedly caused by using a CBD product marketed as THC-free. He sued the manufacturer under RICO, claiming his job loss constituted a business injury. The district court dismissed the case, applying the so-called “antecedent personal injury bar,” which precludes recovery under RICO for business losses resulting from personal injury. The Second Circuit reversed.Writing for the Court, Justice Barrett rejected the categorical bar. The Court held that while civil RICO does not authorize damages for personal injuries themselves, it does not exclude claims for business or property losses merely because they originate from a personal injury. Drawing on the statute’s text, the Court emphasized the ordi

Send us a textIn FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments, the Supreme Court unanimously vacated a Fifth Circuit decision that found the Food and Drug Administration acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it denied authorization for flavored e-cigarette products. Under the Tobacco Control Act of 2009, manufacturers must receive FDA approval before marketing “new tobacco products,” including most modern e-cigarettes. The Act permits approval only if the product is “appropriate for the protection of the public health,” requiring the FDA to weigh population-wide risks and benefits, including youth usage.Respondents, manufacturers of flavored e-liquids, submitted premarket applications but failed to provide robust scientific evidence—such as randomized controlled trials or longitudinal studies—showing their products posed fewer risks than tobacco-flavored alternatives. The FDA denied their applications. The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, held the FDA improperly departed from its own guidance and failed to consid

Send us a textIn United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit and held that a bankruptcy trustee cannot use §544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code to claw back funds from the federal government under a state fraudulent-transfer law, due to sovereign immunity. The case arose after shareholders of a failed Utah business used $145,000 of company money to pay personal federal tax debts. The bankruptcy trustee sought to “avoid” that transfer under Utah law, invoking §544(b), which permits a trustee to assert the rights of an “actual creditor” to void certain transfers. The government argued the claim was barred because sovereign immunity prevents such a state-law suit against the United States.The lower courts sided with the trustee, reasoning that §106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code waived sovereign immunity for actions brought under §544. But the Supreme Court disagreed. Writing for the Court, Justice Jackson held that §106(a)’s waiver applies only to the federal claim under §544—not to the state-law

Send us a textIn Bondi v. Vanderstok, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and upheld the ATF’s 2022 rule interpreting the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA) to cover certain “ghost gun” kits and unfinished firearm parts. The GCA requires licenses and background checks for firearm sales and defines “firearm” to include both weapons and their frames or receivers. In recent years, companies have sold weapon parts kits enabling individuals to easily assemble functional guns at home, leading to a surge in untraceable “ghost guns.” Challengers brought a facial Administrative Procedure Act challenge, arguing the GCA does not authorize the ATF to regulate incomplete kits or parts. The Fifth Circuit agreed, holding the statute covers only fully functional weapons and finished frames or receivers. The Supreme Court disagreed. Writing for the Court, Justice Gorsuch held that the statute’s text, structure, and context support the ATF’s rule. Kits like Polymer80’s, which can be assembled into operable weapons in 20 mi

Send us a textIn Delligatti v. United States, the Supreme Court held that New York attempted second-degree murder qualifies as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. §924(c) because the knowing or intentional causation of death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the use of physical force under §924(c)(3)(A). Salvatore Delligatti was convicted under §924(c) after recruiting gang members to kill a suspected police informant and providing a loaded revolver for the crime. Before trial, he moved to dismiss the §924(c) charge, arguing that the predicate offense—attempted murder under the violent-crimes-in-aid-of-racketeering (VICAR) statute (§1959(a)(5))—was not a crime of violence. His argument relied on New York law, which allows second-degree murder to be committed by omission, such as failing to perform a legal duty, meaning it does not categorically require the use of physical force. The Second Circuit rejected his argument, concluding that attempted second-degree murder under New York law necessar

Send us a textIn Thompson v. United States the Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. §1014, which prohibits “knowingly mak[ing] any false statement” to influence the FDIC’s actions on a loan, does not extend to statements that are merely misleading but not technically false.Patrick Thompson, a former Chicago Alderman, was charged under §1014 after disputing his loan balance in conversations with FDIC contractors, stating he had only borrowed $110,000 when in fact he had borrowed $219,000 in total. A jury convicted him, and the lower courts upheld the conviction on the basis that his statements, though potentially technically true, were misleading. They concluded §1014 criminalizes misleading statements.The Supreme Court reversed, emphasizing that the statute's text criminalizes only “false” statements—not misleading ones. The Court distinguished between the two, noting that misleading statements can be true, and true statements are not false. Because Congress included only the word “false,” and not “misleadi

Send us a text​In City and County of San Francisco v. Environmental Protection Agency, the Supreme Court addressed the scope of the EPA's authority under the Clean Water Act (CWA). The case arose when the EPA issued a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit to San Francisco's wastewater treatment facilities, including provisions that prohibited discharges contributing to violations of water quality standards and creating pollution or nuisance as defined by California law. San Francisco challenged these "end-result" requirements, arguing they exceeded the EPA's statutory authority.​The Ninth Circuit upheld the EPA's permit conditions, interpreting Section 1311(b)(1)(C) of the CWA to authorize any limitations necessary to meet water quality standards, not limited to specific effluent limitations.​The Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that Section 1311(b)(1)(C) does not authorize the EPA to include "end-result" provisions in NPDES permits

Send us a textIn Dewberry Group, Inc. v. Dewberry Engineers Inc., the Supreme Court addressed the scope of monetary remedies under the Lanham Act. The case arose from a trademark dispute between two entities using the "Dewberry" name. The district court awarded the plaintiff not only the defendant's profits but also those of affiliated companies. The Fourth Circuit upheld this award, reasoning that a broad interpretation of "defendant’s profits" was permissible under the statute.​ The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that a plaintiff in a trademark infringement case under the Lanham Act may recover only the profits of the infringing defendant itself—not those of its affiliates or related entities. The Court emphasized principles of corporate separateness and statutory interpretation, rejecting the expansive reading of "defendant’s profits" adopted by the lower court.​ Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Read by RJ Dieken.

Send us a textIn Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., the Supreme Court held that a case voluntarily dismissed without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) qualifies as a "final proceeding" under Rule 60(b), allowing a district court to reopen the case. Gary Waetzig sued Halliburton for age discrimination but later dismissed his case without prejudice and pursued arbitration. After losing in arbitration, he sought to reopen his federal case and vacate the arbitration award under Rule 60(b). The district court granted his motion, but the Tenth Circuit reversed. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Alito explained that the text, context, and history of Rule 60(b) support treating a voluntary dismissal as final for purposes of post-judgment relief. The ruling clarifies that Rule 60(b) relief is discretionary and distinct from appellate finality, ensuring courts retain flexibility to revisit cases when necessary. The Court reverses and remands for further proceedings.Justice

Send us a textIn Glossip v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant is entitled to a new trial when the prosecution knowingly fails to correct false testimony and that error could have contributed to the verdict. Richard Glossip was convicted and sentenced to death based primarily on the testimony of Justin Sneed, who claimed Glossip orchestrated the 1997 murder of Barry Van Treese. Years later, newly discovered evidence revealed that the prosecution withheld key documents, allowed Sneed to give false testimony about his mental health history, and engaged in other misconduct. Oklahoma’s attorney general ultimately conceded that Glossip’s conviction was tainted and supported granting him a new trial, but the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the argument and upheld the conviction. The Supreme Court ruled that the prosecution’s failure to correct Sneed’s false testimony violated Napue v. Illinois, which prohibits the government from allowing false evidence to go unchallenged. Given

Send us a textIn Lackey v. Stinnie, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs who secure only preliminary injunctive relief before their case becomes moot do not qualify as "prevailing parties" entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. §1988(b). Virginia drivers challenged the constitutionality of a law suspending licenses for unpaid court fines. After a district court granted a preliminary injunction, the Virginia General Assembly repealed the law, and restored licenses -- making the case moot. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts explains that preliminary injunctions do not constitute enduring, merits-based relief because they are temporary and do not resolve the case. The ruling reinforces prior precedents, including Buckhannon Board & Care Home v. West Virginia DHHR and Sole v. Wyner, requiring a judicially sanctioned, enduring change in the legal relationship between parties to qualify for attorney’s fees. The Court also notes that this decision does not apply to consent decrees, sin

Send us a textIn Williams v. Reed, the Supreme Court rejects Alabama’s administrative-exhaustion rule, holding that states cannot require claimants to complete an allegedly delayed administrative process before filing a 42 U.S.C. §1983 lawsuit challenging that very delay. Writing for the Court, Justice Kavanaugh explains that the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision effectively immunized state officials from §1983 claims, contradicting prior precedents such as Felder v. Casey and Haywood v. Drown. The ruling clarifies that a state law cannot shield officials from federal civil rights litigation by erecting procedural roadblocks. The Court reverses and remands, rejecting arguments that alternative remedies like mandamus petitions justify Alabama’s exhaustion requirement. Justice Thomas dissents, joined in part by Justices Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett, arguing that the Court improperly disregards Alabama’s jurisdictional framework. Read by RJ Dieken.

Send us a textIn Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Heath, the Supreme Court unanimously affirms that E-Rate reimbursement requests qualify as “claims” under the False Claims Act (FCA). The case centers on whether federal subsidies distributed through the E-Rate program—funded by contributions from telecommunications carriers and administered by a private corporation—constitute government-provided money for FCA purposes. Writing for the Court, Justice Kagan holds that because the government transferred over $100 million from the U.S. Treasury into the E-Rate fund, it “provided” a portion of the money requested, satisfying the statutory definition under 31 U.S.C. §3729(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). The ruling rejects Wisconsin Bell’s argument that the government was merely an intermediary, emphasizing that the government actively collected, managed, and disbursed funds, akin to its broader fiscal operations. The decision affirms the Seventh Circuit and allows the FCA suit to proceed. Justices Thomas and Kavanaug

Send us a textIn Republic of Hungary v. Simon, the Supreme Court held the mere allegation of commingling funds doesn't satisfy the commercial nexus requirement under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)’s expropriation exception. Holocaust survivors sued Hungary and its national railway, seeking damages for property seized during World War II, arguing that Hungary liquidated the property, commingled the proceeds with government funds, and later used some of those funds in U.S. commercial activities.The Court ruled that the FSIA requires plaintiffs to plausibly trace specific expropriated property or its direct proceeds to commercial activity in the United States. A broad commingling theory, doesn't meet this standard. The Court vacated the D.C. Circuit’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. Justice Sotomayor writing for a unanimous Court. Read by Jeff Barnum. 

Send us a textAndrew v. WhiteIn Andrew v. White, the Supreme Court reviewed the Tenth Circuit's decision to reject Brenda Andrew's due process challenge to her conviction for murder. Andrew was charged with murdering her husband -- at trial, the prosecution introduced prejudicial evidence with little probative value to the issue of her guilt. This included her sexual history, personal attire, and alleged failings as a wife and mother. The prosecution further elicited evidence meant to contrast this with her husband's character. On appeal, Andrew alleged that these irrelevant characteristics were meant to improperly impute the murder to her. The Tenth Circuit rejected her due process claim, but the Supreme Court disagreed. Though the decision below reasoned that there was no general rule that the wrongful admission of prejudicial evidence violates due process -- the Supreme Court disagreed. Relying on Payne v. Tennessee, the Court clarified that introducing inadmissible prejudicial evidence, may

***Special edition -- with no syllabus in this case -- the recording includes the entire per curiam decision, as well as the two concurring opinions.***In TikTok Inc. v. Garland, the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act. The Act prohibits U.S. companies from providing services to TikTok unless its U.S. operations are separated from Chinese control.TikTok and a group of U.S. users argued that the Act constitutes a content-based restriction on speech because it singles out TikTok's platform, targeting the content it hosts and its unique mode of communication. They contended that such a restriction is subject to strict scrutiny, the highest level of judicial review, and that the government could not meet the burden of proving the law was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest. TikTok asserted that less restrictive alternatives, such as data localization or transparency measures, could address any national secu